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Abstract
Ehlers and Klaus (2003) study so-called house allocation problems and claim to
characterize all rules satisfying eciency, independence of irrelevant objects, and
resource-monotonicity on two preference domains (Ehlers and Klaus, 2003, Theorem 1).
They explicitly prove Theorem 1 for preference domain R0 which requires that the null
object is always the worst object and mention that the corresponding proofs for the
larger domain R of unrestricted preferences \are completely analogous."
Quesada (2009) in a recent working paper claims to have found a counterexam-
ple that shows that Theorem 1 is not correct on the unrestricted domain R. In
Lemma 1, we prove that Quesada's (2009) example in not a counterexample to Ehlers
and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1). However, in Example 1 and Lemma 2, we demonstrate
how to adjust Quesada's (2009) original idea to indeed establish a counterexample to
Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) on the general domain R.
Quesada (2009) also proposes a way of correcting the result on the general domain
R by strengthening independence of irrelevant objects in two ways: in addition to
requiring that the chosen allocation should depend only on preferences over the set
of available objects (which always includes the null object), he adds two situations
in which the allocation should also be invariant when preferences over the null object
change. We here demonstrate that it is sucient to require only one of Quesada's (2009)
additional independence requirements to reestablish the result of Theorem 1 on the gen-
eral domain R.
Finally, while Quesada (2009) essentially replicates the original proofs of Ehlers and
Klaus (2003) using his stronger independence condition, here we oer a short proof that
uses the established result of Theorem 1 for the restricted domain R0.
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11 House Allocation with Variable Resources
This section equals Section 2 in Ehlers and Klaus (2003). It is included in this working paper
version for completeness (so that the reader does not necessarily have to look up Ehlers and
Klaus, 2003).
Let N denote a nite set of agents, jNj  2. Let K denote a set of potential real objects.
Not receiving any real object is called \receiving the null object." Let 0 represent the null
object. Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a preference relation Ri over all objects K [f0g.
Given x;y 2 K [ f0g, x Ri y means that agent i weakly prefers x to y, and x Pi y means
that agent i strictly prefers x to y. We assume that Ri is strict, i.e., Ri is a linear order
over K [ f0g. Let R denote the class of all linear orders over K [ f0g, and RN the set of
(preference) proles R = (Ri)i2N such that for all i 2 N, Ri 2 R. Given K0  K [ f0g,
let RijK0 denote the restriction of Ri to K0 and RjK0 = (RijK0)i2N. Let R0   R denote the
class of preference relations where the null object is the worst object. That is, if Ri 2 R0,
then all real objects are \goods": for all x 2 K; x Pi 0.
An allocation is a list a = (ai)i2N such that for all i 2 N, ai 2 K [ f0g, and none of the
real objects in K is assigned to more than one agent. Note that 0, the null object, can be
assigned to any number of agents and that not all real objects have to be assigned. Let A
denote the set of all allocations. Let H denote the set of all non-empty subsets H of K. A
(house allocation) problem consists of a preference prole R 2 RN and a set of real objects
H 2 H. Note that the associated set of available objects H [ f0g includes the null object
which is available in any economy. An (allocation) rule is a function ' : RN  H ! A
such that for all problems (R;H) 2 RN  H, '(R;H) 2 A is feasible, i.e., for all i 2 N,
'i(R;H) 2 H [f0g. By feasibility, each agent receives an available object. Given i 2 N, we
call 'i(R;H) the allotment of agent i at '(R;H).
A natural requirement for a rule is that the chosen allocation depends only on preferences
over the set of available objects.
Independence of Irrelevant Objects: For all (R;H) 2 RN  H and all R0 2 RN such
that RjH[f0g = R0jH[f0g, '(R;H) = '(R0;H).
Next, a rule chooses only (Pareto) ecient allocations.
Eciency: For all (R;H) 2 RN H, there is no feasible allocation a 2 A such that for all
i 2 N, ai Ri 'i(R;H), with strict preference holding for some j 2 N.
When the set of objects varies, another natural requirement is resource-monotonicity. It
describes the eect of a change in the available resource on the welfare of the agents. A rule
satises resource-monotonicity, if after such a change, either all agents (weakly) lose or all
(weakly) gain.
It is easy to see that in combination with eciency, resource-monotonicity means that if
for some xed preference prole and some xed set of objects, additional objects are available,
then { this being good news { all agents (weakly) gain. Since we study resource-monotonicity
together with eciency we use the latter notion to formalize resource-monotonicity.
2Resource-Monotonicity: For all R 2 RN and all H;H0 2 H, if H  H0, then for all
i 2 N, 'i(R;H0) Ri 'i(R;H).
2 Mixed Dictator-Pairwise-Exchange Rules
This section equals the rst part of Section 3 in Ehlers and Klaus (2003) (until the statement
of Theorem 1). It is included in this working paper version for completeness (so that the
reader does not necessarily have to look up Ehlers and Klaus, 2003).
Our aim is to describe the class of rules that are ecient, independent of irrelevant objects,
and resource-monotonic. We show that each such rule allocates the available objects in a
sequence of steps as follows: At the rst step there is either an agent who receives for all
problems his most preferred object from the set of available objects|we call such an agent
a dictator|or there are exactly two agents who partition the set of available real objects
among themselves and for all problems their allotments result from a pairwise exchange
using this partition as endowments. At the second step there is again either a dictator or
a pairwise exchange (restricted to the remaining available objects); and so on. Here, we
call such a rule a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rule (Ehlers, 2002). In Ehlers, Klaus,
and P apai (2002) we discuss essentially the same class of rules under the name \restricted
endowment inheritance rules." After formally dening mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange
rules, we brie
y discuss another interpretation of these rules as so-called ecient priority
rules.
For the formal description we use \(endowment) inheritance tables" (P apai, 2000). For
each real object x 2 K, a one-to-one function x : f1;:::;jNjg ! N species the inheritance
of object x. Here agent x(1) is initially endowed with x. If x is still available after x(1)
received an object, then agent x(2) inherits x; and so on. Let N denote the set of all
one-to-one functions from f1;:::;jNjg to N. An inheritance table is a prole  = (x)x2K
specifying the inheritance of each real object. We call an inheritance table  a mixed dictator-
pairwise-exchange inheritance table with respect to S = (S1;S2;:::;Sm) if
(i) (S1;S2;:::;Sm) is a partition of N into singletons and pairs, i.e., for all t 2 f1;:::;mg,
2  jStj  1,
(ii) row 1 and row jS1j of the inheritance table contain exactly S1, i.e., fx(1)jx 2 Kg = S1
and fx(jS1j)jx 2 Kg = S1, and
(iii) row (1 +
Pt 1
l=1 jSlj) and row (
Pt
l=1 jSlj) contain exactly St, i.e., for all t 2 f2;:::;mg,
fx(1 +
Pt 1
l=1 jSlj)jx 2 Kg = St and fx(
Pt
l=1 jSlj)jx 2 Kg = St.
Given i 2 N and H 2 H, let top(Ri;H) denote agent i's most preferred object under Ri in
H [ f0g.
Mixed Dictator-Pairwise-Exchange Rules, '(;S): Given a mixed dictator-pairwise-
exchange inheritance table  with respect to S = (S1;S2;:::;Sm), for all (R;H) 2 RN  H
the allocation '(;S)(R;H) is inductively determined as follows:
3Step 1:
(a) If S1 = fig, then '
(;S)
i (R;H) = top(Ri;H).
(b) Let S1 = fi;jg (i 6= j). If top(Ri;H) = top(Rj;H)  h1 2 H and h1(1) = i,
then '
(;S)
i (R;H) = h1 and '
(;S)





j (R;H) = top(Rj;H).





i (R;H)g denote the set of objects that are assigned up
to Step t.
(a) If St = fig, then '
(;S)
i (R;H) = top(Ri;HnHt 1).
(b) Let St = fi;jg (i 6= j). If top(Ri;HnHt 1) = top(Rj;HnHt 1)  ht 2 HnHt 1 and
ht(1 +
Pt 1
l=1 jSlj) = i, then '
(;S)
i (R;H) = ht and '
(;S)
j (R;H) = top(Rj;Hn(Ht 1 [ fhtg)).
Otherwise, '
(;S)
i (R;H) = top(Ri;HnHt 1) and '
(;S)
j (R;H) = top(Rj;HnHt 1).
Mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are a subclass of endowment inheritance rules
discussed in Ehlers, Klaus, and P apai (2002).1
As already mentioned, instead of interpreting a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rule as
an endowment inheritance rule, one can equivalently interpret it as a priority rule. Take the
underlying inheritance table and use it as follows for each real object x:  1
x (i) <  1
x (j)
means \agent i has higher priority for object x than agent j." A rule violates the priority of
agent i for object x if there is a preference prole under which i envies another agent j who
obtains x even though i has a higher priority for x than j. A rule is a priority rule if it never
violates the specied priorities. In an earlier version of his article, Ergin (2002) shows that
ecient priority rules can be described through the so-called serial-bidictatorship algorithm,
which for house allocation problems turns out to be equivalent to the algorithm underly-
ing the corresponding mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules. For a further discussion of
ecient priority rules we refer to Ehlers and Klaus (2002) and Ergin (2002).2
Our main result also applies to the domain RN
0 where all real objects are \goods".
Theorem 1. Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1)
Let jKj > jNj. On the domain RN (RN
0 ), mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are the only
rules satisfying eciency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity.
1Endowment inheritance rules are based on Gale's top trading cycle algorithm. We omit their somewhat
tedious denition and refer the interested reader to P apai (2000). It is interesting to note that on the
domain RN
0 some inheritance tables that do not satisfy the conditions of a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange
inheritance table may still generate an endowment inheritance rule that equals a mixed dictator-pairwise-
exchange rule.
2For a more detailed discussion and comparison of endowment inheritance and priority rules see
Kesten (2006).
43 Problems Concerning Ehlers and Klaus's (2003)
Theorem 1 on Domain R
3.1 Counterexamples to Theorem 1
We would like to note that Quesada (2009) uses very dierent notation and terminology
compared to Ehlers and Klaus (2003). Since this correction will likely be read as an addition
or complement to Ehlers and Klaus (2003), we return to the notation and terminology as
used in Ehlers and Klaus (2003) and adjust Quesada's (2009) notation and terminology
accordingly (except when quoting from Quesada, 2009).
In a recent working paper Quesada (2009) claims to have found a counterexample that
shows that Ehlers and Klaus's (2003) Theorem 1, Theorem 1 for short, is not correct on the
unrestricted domain R. We quote from Quesada (2009, p. 2):
\This characterization does not appear to be correct for the domain R. To see
this, consider the allocation rule f dened as follows: with N = f1;2;3g and
x 2 A, the hierarchy of dictators 1{2{3 determines the allocation except if 2
prefers the null object to x and x is what both 1 and 3 prefer most, in which
case 3 receives x and the hierarchy 1{2 determines the rest of the allocation.
Whereas f satises independence, eciency and monotonicity, it does not have
a hierarchy of diarchies."3
First, in Lemma 1, we show that the rule f that Antonio Quesada describes above is not
a counterexample to Theorem 1 on the general domain R. However, Antonio Quesada
did correctly suspect that there are problems with Theorem 1 on the general domain R;
in Example 1 we demonstrate how to adjust Quesada's original idea to indeed establish a
counterexample to Theorem 1 on the general domain R. In Lemma 2 we prove that our
correction of Quesada's (2009) example is the \desired" counterexample that Quesada might
have had in mind.
Lemma 1. Quesada's rule violates resource-monotonicity
Rule f as introduced by Quesada (2009, p. 2) violates resource-monotonicity.
Proof. Let N = f1;2;3g and x 2 K. Quesada's (2009) rule f is dened as follows: for all
(R;H) 2 RN  H,
(a) if agent 2 prefers the null object to x and x is what agents 1 and 3 prefer most, the
serial dictatorship corresponding to the order (3;1;2) is used; and
(b) otherwise the serial dictatorship corresponding to the order (1;2;3) is used.
Consider preferences R such that (a) applies and more specically x P1 0:::, 0 P2 x:::, and
xP30:::, i.e., object x and the null object are the two top ranked alternatives for all agents.
Then, f(R;fxg) = (0;0;x) and agent 3 receives object x.
3With \hierarchy of diarchies" Antonio Quesada refers to our mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules.
5Next, consider an object y 2 Knfxg (note that such an object exists since the number of
objects is assumed to be larger than the number of agents) and consider preferences R0 such
that (b) applies and x P 0
1 0 P 0
1 y :::, y P 0
2 0 P 0
2 x:::, and y P 0
3 x P 0
3 0:::, i.e., objects x, y, and
the null object are the three top ranked alternatives for all agents. Note that now agent 3
now does not rank object x as his most preferred object and therefore the serial dictatorship
corresponding to the order (1;2;3) is used. Thus, f(R0;fx;yg) = (x;y;0). Next, observe that
Rjfx;0g = R0jfx;0g. Hence, by independence of irrelevant objects, f(R;fxg) = f(R0;fxg) =
(0;0;x). Now note that when adding object y to the problem (R0;fxg), agent 3 switches from
receiving object x to receiving the null object. Formally, x = f3(R0;fxg)P3f3(R0;fx;yg) = 0;
a violation of resource-monotonicity.
Example 1. Let N = f1;2;3g, x 2 K and jKj  2. Rule ' is dened as follows: for all
(R;H) 2 RN  H,
(a) if x 2 H, xP2 0, and x is what agents 1 and 3 prefer most in H, the serial dictatorship
corresponding to the order (3;1;2) is used; and
(b) otherwise the serial dictatorship corresponding to the order (1;3;2) is used.
Note that ' is not a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rule because for any problem (R;H)
such that x 2 H is what agents 1 and 3 prefer most in H, we have '3(R;H) = x if x P2 0
and '1(R;H) = x if 0 P2 x.
Lemma 2. A counterexample to Theorem 1 on Domain R
Rule ' as dened in Example 1 satises eciency, independence of irrelevant objects, and
resource-monotonicity.
Proof. It is obvious that rule ' as dened in Example 1 satises eciency and independence
of irrelevant objects. In order to check resource-monotonicity, let R 2 RN and H;H0 2 H
be such that H  H0. If (R;H) and (R;H0) are both of type (a) (or both of type (b)),
then resource-monotonicity is satised by ' because serial dictatorship rules are resource-
monotonic.
We are left with the case where (R;H) and (R;H0) are not of the same \type" (a) or (b).
First, suppose that (R;H) is of type (a) and (R;H0) is of type (b). Then, by denition
of ', '3(R;H) = x. Now, if '3(R;H0) = x, then resource-monotonicity is satised because
the order in the serial dictatorship between 1 and 2 is unchanged in (a) and (b). Otherwise
'3(R;H0) 6= x and because (R;H0) is of type (b), at '(R;H0) agent 1 or agent 3 receives
an object in H0nH and the other agent either receives x or also an object in H0nH. Now,
resource-monotonicity is satised because agents 1 and 3 are weakly better o and agent 2
can choose from a larger set of objects under (R;H0) than under (R;H).
Second, suppose that (R;H) is of type (b) and (R;H0) is of type (a). Then, by denition
of ', '3(R;H0) = x. Since (R;H) is of type (b) and (R;H) not of type (a), we must have
x 2 H0nH. Then, '3(R;H0) R3 '3(R;H) and both agents 1 and 2 can choose from a larger
set of objects at (R;H0) than at (R;H). Since the order in the serial dictatorship between
1 and 2 is unchanged in (a) and (b), resource-monotonicity is satised.
63.2 Corrections of Theorem 1
Quesada (2009, p. 3) proposes a correction of Theorem 1 on Domain R that involves strength-
ening independence of irrelevant objects. This new independence axiom, referred to as SIN,
is described as follows:
\This note shows that the characterization can be restored by strengthening
independence of irrelevant objects. The new independence axiom suggested (see
SIN in Section 3) associates the same allocation to two preference proles P and
Q when: (i) P restricted to the set of objects B  A to be assigned coincides
with Q restricted to B; (ii) for agents receiving the null object 0 under P, the
preference for 0 does not diminish when passing from P to Q; and (iii) for agents
receiving some object under P, that object is still more preferred in Q than 0.
If (ii) and (iii) hold, the changes in the preference prole caused by moving the
null object up or down the preference rankings may be considered irrelevant. By
(ii), no agent receiving 0 has increased the preference of some object over 0, so it
is reasonable for those agents to still receive 0. And, by (iii), no agent receiving
some object has increased the preference of the null object over the received
object, so it is reasonable for those agents to receive the same object as before."
The denition of SIN adjusted to the notation of Ehlers and Klaus (2003) is given next.
For all i 2 N, all Ri 2 R, all H 2 K, and all x 2 H [ f0g, the lower contour set of
RijH[f0g at the null object is L(RijH[f0g;0)  fx 2 H [ f0g : 0 RijH[f0g xg.
Quesada's SIN Property: For all (R;H) 2 RNH and all R0 2 RN such that RjH = R0jH,
if for all i 2 N,
(i) 'i(R;H) = 0 implies L(RijH[f0g;0)  L(R0
ijH[f0g;0) and
(ii) 'i(R;H) 6= 0 implies 'i(R;H) P 0
i 0,
then '(R;H) = '(R0;H).
After dening SIN Quesada (2009, p. 5) states:
\SIN strengthens the independence of irrelevant objects condition in Ehlers
and Klaus (2003, p. 547), which asserts that QjB+ = PjB+ implies f(Q;B) =
f(P;B).4 SIN declares the preference for 0 to be irrelevant if: (i) agents receiv-
ing 0 consider 0 at least as preferred as before; and (ii) agents not receiving 0
consider the object received as preferred to 0."
First, we would like to remark that Quesada's claim that SIN strengthens the independence
of irrelevant objects condition in Ehlers and Klaus (2003, p. 547) is only true for ecient
rules.5 Since independence of irrelevant objects is used together with eciency, this is not
4In our notation: RjH[f0g = R0jH[f0g implies '(R;H) = '(R0;H).




that Rjfx;y;0g = R0jfx;y;0g. A rule ' that would assign '(R;fx;y;0g) = x and '(R0;fx;y;0g) = y would
violate independence of irrelevant objects, but since only objects that are worse than 0 are assigned, SIN is
not violated.
7really a problem. Furthermore, it turns out that requirement (i) in the denition of SIN is
not necessary for the correction of Theorem 1 on Domain R. We formulate independence of
irrelevant objects with the additional SIN property (ii) as a separate property.
Strong Independence of Irrelevant Objects: For all (R;H) 2 RN H and all R0 2 RN
such that
(i) RjH[f0g = R0jH[f0g or
(ii) RjH = R0jH and for all i 2 N, 'i(R;H) 6= 0 implies 'i(R;H) P 0
i 0,
'(R;H) = '(R0;H).6
We are now ready to present a correction of Theorem 1 on Domain R.
Theorem 2. Let jKj > jNj. On the domain RN, mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are
the only rules satisfying eciency, strong independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-
monotonicity.
Our proof of this correction diers in two ways from the one that Quesada (2009) presents.
First, we use a \weaker strengthening" of independence of irrelevant objects (under eciency,
Quesada's SIN property implies our strong independence of irrelevant objects property, which
implies Ehlers and Klaus's (2003) independence of irrelevant objects property). Second,
while Quesada (2009) essentially replicates the original proofs of Ehlers and Klaus (2003,
Theorem 1) using SIN, here we oer a comparably short proof that uses the established
result of Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) for the restricted domain R0.
Before proving Theorem 2, we establish two useful implications of eciency and resource-
monotonicity.
The following lemma states that eciency and resource-monotonicity imply that taking out
an unassigned object does not change the assigned allocation.
Lemma 3. Let ' be an ecient and resource-monotonic rule and (R;H) 2 RN  H. If for
all i 2 N, 'i(R;H) 6= x 2 H, then '(R;H) = '(R;H n fxg).
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that (R;H) 2 RNH is such that for all i 2 N, 'i(R;H) 6=
x 2 H and '(R;H) 6= '(R;H nfxg). Note that object x is neither assigned at (R;H) nor at
(R;H n fxg), i.e., '(R;H) is feasible for (R;H n fxg). Hence, by eciency, there exists an
agent j 2 N such that 'j(R;H nfxg)Pj 'j(R;H); contradicting resource-monotonicity.
The following lemma states that eciency and resource-monotonicity imply that adding an
object that none of the agents who are assigned objects would prefer will not change the
assigned allocation for these agents. For (R;H) 2 RN H, we denote the set of agents who
are assigned objects in H at '(R;H) by N+(';R;H)  fi 2 N : '(R;H) 2 Hg.
Lemma 4. Let ' be an ecient and resource-monotonic rule and (R;H) 2 RN  H. Let
x 2 K n H and R0 2 RN such that R0jH[f0g = RjH[f0g and for all i 2 N+(';R;H),
'i(R;H) P 0
i x. Then, for all i 2 N+(';R;H), 'i(R;H) = 'i(R0;H [ fxg).
6Note that part (ii) is a stronger version of the property \Independence of Truncations" (Ehlers, 2008):
RjH = R0jH and for all i 2 N such that 'i(R;H) 6= 0 and all x 2 H, x P0
i 0 implies x Pi 0.
8Proof. Let (R;H) 2 RN  H, x 2 K n H, and R0 2 RN such that R0jH[f0g = RjH[f0g and
for all i 2 N+(';R;H), 'i(R;H) P 0
i x. By resource-monotonicity, for all i 2 N+(';R;H),
'i(R0;H [ fxg) Ri 'i(R;H). Hence, object x at (R0;H [ fxg) is not assigned to any agent
in N+(';R;H) (it might be assigned to any of the agents who did not receive an object).
Since '(R;H) is eciency and only agents in N+(';R;H) received any objects in H, the
only way to satisfy resource-monotonicity is to not change the assigned allocation for agents
in N+(';R;H), i.e., for all i 2 N+(';R;H), 'i(R;H) = 'i(R0;H [ fxg).
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout the proof, when referring to Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1), we refer to
Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) on the domain R0.
It is easy to verify that mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules satisfy eciency, strong
independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity since no more than two agents
\trade" at any step. In proving the converse, let jKj > jNj and let ' be a rule satisfying
eciency, strong independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity.
By Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1), ' equals a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange
rules on the domain R0. Hence, on the domain R0, ' = '(;S). Suppose, by contradiction,
that on the general domain R, ' 6= '(;S). Then, there exists (R;H) 2 RN  H such that
'(R;H) 6= '(;S)(R;H). Note that by Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1), R 62 RN
0 .
Step 1. Let j 2 N+(';R;H), i.e., 'j(R;H) 6= 0. Hence, by eciency, 'j(R;H) Pj 0. Let
R0
j be obtained from Rj by making the null object the worst object, i.e., R0
j 2 R0 and
RjH = R0jH. Let R0 = (R0
j;R j).7 By construction of R0, (ii) in the denition of strong
independence of irrelevant objects applies to R;R0 2 RN and '(R;H) = '(R0;H). By
the denition of '(;S) it also follows (for '
(;S)
j (R;H) 6= 0 as well as for '
(;S)
j (R;H) = 0)
that '(;S)(R;H) = '(;S)(R0;H). Hence, '(R0;H) 6= '(;S)(R0;H). We repeat this type of
preference transformation for all agents i 2 N+(';R0;H) and denote the resulting prole by
^ R. Hence, ( ^ R;H) 2 RNH is such that '( ^ R;H) 6= '(;S)( ^ R;H) and for all i 2 N+('; ^ R;H),
^ Ri 2 R0. Note that by Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1), ^ R 62 RN
0 .
Step 2. By eciency, '( ^ R;H) 6= '(;S)( ^ R;H) implies that there exists an agent j such that
'j( ^ R;H) ^ Pj '
(;S)
j ( ^ R;H). Since, '
(;S)
j ( ^ R;H) ^ Rj 0, this implies 'j( ^ R;H) ^ Pj 0. Thus, by
construction of ^ R, j 2 N+('; ^ R;H) and ^ Rj 2 R0.
Assume, without loss of generality, that the set of agents who are assigned the null
object at '( ^ R;H) equals N0('; ^ R;H)  N n N+('; ^ R;H) = f1;:::;kg (k  1 follows from
^ R 62 RN
0 ).
Next, we show that it is without loss of generality to assume that there exist a1;:::;ak 2
K n H. If jK n Hj < k, then remove all objects from H that are not assigned at '( ^ R;H).
Denote the remaining set of objects by ^ H (note that ^ H   H) and the new problem by
( ^ R; ^ H). By Lemma 3, '( ^ R;H) = '( ^ R; ^ H). By ^ H   H and resource-monotonicity, for
7We use the notation R j = RNnfjg.
9all i 2 N, '
(;S)
i ( ^ R;H) ^ Ri '
(;S)
i ( ^ R; ^ H). Recall that there exists an agent j such that
'j( ^ R;H) ^ Pj'
(;S)
j ( ^ R;H). Hence, 'j( ^ R; ^ H) = 'j( ^ R;H) ^ Pj'
(;S)
j ( ^ R;H) ^ Rj'
(;S)
j ( ^ R; ^ H). Thus,
'j( ^ R; ^ H) ^ Pj'
(;S)
j ( ^ R; ^ H) and '( ^ R; ^ H) 6= '(;S)( ^ R; ^ H). Since we have assumed that jKj > jNj,
a1;:::;ak 2 K n ^ H exist.
Hence, without loss of generality, we now consider ( ^ R;H) and j 2 N+('; ^ R;H) with
'j( ^ R;H) ^ Pj '
(;S)
j ( ^ R;H), N0('; ^ R;H) = f1;:::;kg, and a1;:::;ak 2 K n H.
First, we focus on agent 1. Recall that '1( ^ R;H) = 0. Let R1 2 RN be such that
R1jH[f0g = ^ RjH[f0g and preferences over a1 are as follows:
(i) agent 1 ranks a1 just above the null object, i.e., for all x 2 H, x ^ P10 implies xP 1
1 a1P 1
1 0,
(ii) if i 2 N0('; ^ R;H) n f1g, then object a1 is the worst object, i.e., for all x 2 H [ f0g,
x P 1
i a1, and
(iii) if i 2 N+('; ^ R;H), then object a1 is the worst object before the null object, i.e., for
all x 2 H, x P 1
i a1 P 1
i 0 (hence, R1
i 2 R0 for agents in N+('; ^ R;H)).
Let H1  H [ fa1g and consider (R1;H1). Agent 1 is the only agent who would prefer
object a1 to the object he receives at '( ^ R;H) (the null object). Hence, by eciency and
resource-monotonicity, '1(R1;H1) = a1. By Lemma 4, for all i 2 N+('; ^ R;H), 'i(R1;H1) =
'i( ^ R;H). In particular, since j 2 N+('; ^ R;H), 'j(R1;H1) = 'j( ^ R;H).
Note that by the denition of '(;S), for all i 2 N n f1g, object a1 is the worst object
or it is the second worst object with the null object ranked immediately after it as worst
object. Hence, for all i 2 N+('(;S); ^ R;H) n f1g, '
(;S)
i (R1;H1) P 1
i a1. Furthermore, if
1 2 N+('(;S); ^ R;H), then by the denition of R1 (i), '
(;S)
1 (R1;H1) P 1
1 a1. Hence, by
Lemma 4, for all i 2 N+('(;S); ^ R;H), '
(;S)
i (R1;H1) = '
(;S)
i ( ^ R;H).
If j 2 N+('(;S); ^ R;H), then '
(;S)
j (R1;H1) = '
(;S)
j ( ^ R;H). Hence, 'j(R1;H1) =
'j( ^ R;H) ^ Pj '
(;S)
j ( ^ R;H) = '
(;S)




If j 62 N+('(;S); ^ R;H), then '
(;S)
j (R1;H1) 2 fa1;0g (since above we have shown
that for all i 2 N+('(;S); ^ R;H), '
(;S)
i (R1;H1) = '
(;S)
i ( ^ R;H)). By the denition of R1
(iii), 'j( ^ R;H) P 1
j a1 P 1
j 0, which implies 'j( ^ R;H) P 1
j '
(;S)
j (R1;H1). Hence, 'j(R1;H1) =
'j( ^ R;H) P 1
j '
(;S)








j (R1;H1), and jN0(';R1;H1)j = jN0('; ^ R;H)j 1. If jN0(';R1;H1)j >
0, we repeat this construction k  1 times (adding objects a2;:::;ak in a similar manner) to




and jN0(';Rk;H)j = 0.
Step 3. Note that by construction of problem (Rk;Hk), N = N+(';Rk;Hk), '(Rk;Hk) 6=
'(;S)(Rk;Hk), and Rk 62 RN
0 . Now, we repeat Step 1 for all agents in N who do not yet
rank the null object as their worst object. Using the same arguments as in Step 1, we then
obtain ( ^ Rk;Hk) 2 RN
0  H such that '( ^ Rk;Hk) 6= '(;S)( ^ Rk;Hk). However, ^ Rk 2 R0 and
'( ^ Rk;Hk) 6= '(;S)( ^ Rk;Hk) contradict Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1).
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